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Language and action: a common intentional,
generative, and inferential process
Abstract: The thesis that language is a special case of action is analysed in terms of the following 
three claims. First, language is presumably just as intentional as action is, in the precise sense that 
both involve largely automatic processing of goal-directed representations, with conscious attention 
essentially granting stability to the process. Second, this largely automatic processing of both 
language and action seems to be based on a shared generative mechanism. Third, this common 
process can be described as a bidirectional inferential device, which at the same time allows the 
prediction of goals from means and the retrodiction of means from goals. These considerations 
converge towards the idea that language processing is based on domain-general processes which are 
shared with non-linguistic action.
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1. Introduction
Is language processed by domain-specific or domain-general processes? I have recently 
pursued some lines of research based on the common assumption that linguistic processes are not 
specific for language since, in an important sense, language is just a special case of action. My 
purpose here is to sum up in a coherent picture three specific themes that have been central in my 
recent work: the nature of intentions in general and of communicative intentions in particular; the 
way (either domain-specific or domain-general) in which linguistic processes can be said to be 
generative; the way (again, either domain-specific or domain-general) in which pragmatic processes 
can be said to be inferential. The first two points raise issues that directly impact the Chomskyan 
paradigm, the third addresses the modular view of pragmatic processing that is argued for by 
Relevance Theory.
Based on these lines of reasoning, the general conclusion that language is a special case of 
action is specified in terms of the following three claims. First, language is presumably just as 
intentional as action is, in the precise sense that both involve largely automatic processing of goal-
directed representations, with conscious attention essentially granting stability to the process. 
Second, this largely automatic processing of both language and action seems to be based on a 
shared generative mechanism, with common neural bases and a quite similar structure of 
representation. Third, this common process can be described as a bidirectional inferential device, 
which at the same time allows the prediction of goals from means and the retrodiction of means 
from goals.
In the next sections I will address in turn the intentional, generative and inferential nature of 
language and action.
2. Communicative intentions
According to some scholars, intentional processes, including communicative ones, are quite 
different from linguistic processes in the narrow sense. A paradigmatic example of this perspective 
is Levelt (1989), according to which the route leading from intention to articulation of linguistic 
utterances is at the same time a route leading from controlled and conscious planning to automatic 
execution. In his account, the cognitive component which performs the intentional planning of 
utterances is called Conceptualizer. Levelt provides the following argument for why this component 
should involve controlled processing:
Clearly, the Conceptualizer involves highly controlled processing. Speakers do not 
have a small, fixed set of intentions that they have learned to realize in speech. 
Communicative intentions can vary in infinite ways, and for each of these ways the 
speaker will have to find new means of expression. This requires much attention. 
(Levelt 1989, 21)
Levelt's argument here seems to be an application of Chomsky's thesis about the productive nature 
of language: just as there is an infinite variability of sentences that can be realized in speech, so 
there must be an infinite variability of utterances in context and therefore of communicative 
intentions behind them. Generally speaking, Levelt adopts a view of language that is compatible 
with Chomsky's program insofar as he approves the idea that syntactic processing is an automatic 
and possibly modular process. In this quotation, though, he employs the argument from productivity 
in order to draw a conclusion that is opposite to the one drawn by Chomsky for syntax: Levelt's 
conclusion is that the process by which communicative intentions are formed cannot be automatic 
and modular.
It is interesting to note that the same argument is employed by Sperber and Wilson (2002) 
with an opposite purpose, that is, with the purpose of arguing that pragmatic processes need to be 
automatic and modular:
In the repertoire of human actions, utterances are much more differentiated than 
other types of actions: many utterances are wholly new, whereas it is relatively rare 
to come across actions that are not reiterations of previous actions. [...] Leaving 
stereotypical utterances aside, the prior probability of most utterances ever 
occurring is close to zero, as Chomsky pointed out long ago. (Sperber & Wilson 
2002, 11)
As is clear, here the infinite variability and unpredictability of linguistic intentions is invoked in 
order to mark the difference with non-communicative intentions. Because of such unpredictability, 
linguistic intentions would be characterized by greater cognitive difficulty than non-communicative 
ones. From this, Sperber and Wilson conclude that the understanding of linguistic intentions would 
require a specific module distinct from that responsible for mind-reading in general.
In sum, both Levelt (1989) and Sperber and Wilson (2002) make an appeal to the argument 
from productivity but with opposite goals. The former uses it in order to argue that linguistic 
intentions have to be managed by controlled processes, while the latter conclude by the same 
argument that the understanding of linguistic intentions requires an automatic module. Sperber and 
Wilson's modularist conclusion is in fact more coherent with the spirit of the Chomskyan argument, 
were it not for the fact that Chomsky did not mean the argument to apply to pragmatic processes. 
All in all, the argument seems not stringent enough to draw any clear conclusion.
Let us then put the productivity argument aside and focus rather on Levelt's thesis that 
utterances are intentionally planned in a controlled manner. This thesis, independently from the 
specific argument used by Levelt, seems to have some intuitive plausibility. Intentions are generally 
defined as goals adopted in a conscious and controlled manner, and language intuitively appears as 
the intentional activity par excellence. On the basis of such assumptions one might trace a 
distinction in line with that proposed by Fodor between central and modular processes: in linguistic 
production, intention formation would be under the control of central processes, while its syntactic 
and phonological implementation would be modular.
However, there are many reasons to think that this demarcation, as well as others on which 
the Chomskyan thesis of the autonomy of syntax is based, does not hold at a closer inspection. I am 
going to report some evidence to that effect and then propose a view which is more coherent with 
that evidence. More precisely, I will call into question the idea that intentional processes are clearly 
delimited a) temporally, in that they would be located at the beginning of actions, and b) as to the 
kind of representation they apply to.
Let us start from the temporality issue. A reference point for the current debate is to be found 
in the well-known studies of Benjamin Libet about the timing of consciousness (e.g., Libet 1992). 
As claimed by Jeannerod (2006, 28), Libet's work has shown that “consciousness of the goal of an 
action is not immediate, it takes time to appear”. According to Jeannerod, since consciousness is a 
slow process while in motor action there are temporal constraints which do not leave enough time 
for consciousness to appear, “it follows that fast and accurate movement can only be executed 
automatically” (Jeannerod 2006, 28).
It should be noted that Jeannerod is making here implicit reference to the idea, which is 
independent from Libet's controversial results, that automatic processes can guide goal-directed 
behaviours. In other words, the idea is that consciousness is not necessary in order to initiate and 
drive goal-directed behaviour insofar as automatic processes may suffice to that effect. In fact, 
starting from the work of Bargh (e.g., Bargh 1989; 1990), decades of research in social psychology 
have shown that goal-directed behaviour can be automatic and unconscious (e.g., Bargh et al. 2001; 
Dijksterhuis, Chartrand, Aarts, 2007; Ferguson, Hassin, Bargh, 2007), even when routines have to 
be flexibly accommodated to the context (Hassin et al. 2009). In Hassin et al.'s (2009, 550) words, 
on the basis of previous experience we form habits conceived as “associative networks that include 
contexts, goals that are regularly pursued in these contexts, and means that one usually uses to attain 
these goals”. Thanks to these networks, goal-directed behaviours can be driven by simple spreading 
activation processes. In line with these considerations, Huang and Bargh (in press) have recently 
insisted on the existence of deep similarities between conscious and unconscious processing of 
goal-directed behaviour. In the control of action, then, it is possible that conscious and unconscious 
processes do not operate in radically different manners, were it not for the respective dynamics of 
activation: conscious processes would grant greater stability insofar as they keep the relevant 
information active until the current goal is attained.
Based on considerations of this sort, Mazzone and Campisi (2013) have proposed that, in 
order for actions to be intentional (in accordance with the definition of intentions as conscious goal 
representations), it is necessary that goal-related structures of representation are activated and that 
consciousness play some role in their processing, but it is not necessary that goals are consciously 
activated from the beginning. As a matter of fact, intentional actions seem to be subserved by an 
automatic flow of goal-related information processing, in the course of which consciousness may 
focus on different components as a function of the circumstances. Thus, consciousness is normally 
distributed in two senses. It is distributed in time, that is, it is present for large portions of the action 
processing but hardly at its initiation. And it is distributed through the entire representation 
structure, in that not only (and not necessarily) high-level goals are conscious: other components of 
the involved representation structures can be conscious as well.
Assuming this is the general picture in the case of intentional action, there seem to be no 
reasons why language should behave differently, at least in face to face communication. In dialogue 
you cannot  plan your  contribution in  advance because you don't  know what  the  other will  do. 
Therefore, the temporal constraints that prevent conscious planning of non-communicative actions 
appear to apply to language production as well (Campisi and Mazzone submitted; more on how the 
argument applies to language processing in Mazzone 2013).
To sum up, contrary to what Levelt contends for language, there are reasons to think that in 
action processing consciousness is not precisely delimited either in the sense of being temporally 
located at the initiation of actions or in the sense that it exclusively concerns high-level goals (for 
instance, communicative intentions) that need to be subsequently implemented by purely automatic 
processes (e.g., by syntactic and phonological processing). In a word, it is not the case that language 
qua intentional action is managed by controlled processing while its low-level implementation is 
devolved to automatic processing. Here an important assumption is that the same information can 
be processed by both automatic and controlled processes as a function of the circumstances, since 
the two processes are largely similar except for the greater stability of the latter.
3. Generative processes
In cognitive explanations there is notoriously a balance between processes and 
representations, in the sense that the more complex the representations, the less complex the 
processes need to be. One very clear example of this strategy is Jackendoff's (2007a) proposal 
according to which it is possible to reinterpret Chomskyan phrase structure rules (such as F → NP – 
VP) as hierarchical representations instead of as procedures or processes. In other words, phrase 
structure rules would be pieces of structure stored in long term memory just as words or idioms: 
“words, regular affixes, idioms, constructions, and ordinary phrase structure rules […] can all be 
expressed in a common formalism, namely as pieces of structure stored in long term memory” 
(Jackendoff 2007a, 11).
This does not imply that, according to Jackendoff, the generative character of Generative 
Grammar is to be abandoned. However, in his view the generation of an infinite number of 
utterances is not granted by specifically linguistic processes but instead by an operation called 
“unification” which is explicitly conceived as domain-general and consists in “clipping together 
pieces of stored structure” (Jackendoff 2007a, 11). In practice, unification does nothing else but 
assemble representations according to what they themselves prescribe, on the basis of their 
hierarchical structure. That is, any higher-level item (for instance, F → NP – VP) prescribes how 
lower-level items (for instance, NP → Det – N; VP → V – NP) must be combined together, and so 
on and so forth.
That a generative mechanism of this sort is at work not only in language but also in (non-
linguistic) action has been recently proposed by Glenberg and Gallese (2012), Pastra and 
Aloimonos (2012), Jackendoff (2007b), and Mazzone (2014a). These authors essentially provide 
two sorts of arguments in favour of that hypothesis. First, they claim that a hierarchical structure of 
representation is required by non-linguistic (as well as linguistic) actions. And second, they make an 
appeal to the evidence that non-linguistic actions share a common neurological basis with language. 
Let us start form the former line of argument.
From a theoretical perspective, starting at least from the classic analysis of Schank and 
Abelson (1977) it is a common assumption that actions are not only analysable but in fact analysed 
and generated by agents on the basis of hierarchical representations. With the words of Baldwin and 
Baird (2001, 172), agents
appear to process continuous action streams in terms of hierarchical relations that 
link smaller-level intentions (e.g. in a kitchen cleaning-up scenario: intending to 
grasp a dish, turn on the water, pass the dish under the water) with intentions at 
higher levels (intending to wash a dish or clean a kitchen).
As a matter of fact, despite the argument of Sperber and Wilson (2002) we mentioned 
above, it is far from obvious that non-linguistic actions are less complex or fewer in number than 
linguistic ones (as argued in Mazzone 2014a). Therefore, even for non-linguistic action we seem to 
need a hierarchical structure capable of generating infinite outputs.
From an empirical perspective, evidence of a hierarchical organization comes from both 
psychological and neurophysiological research. In the psychological domain, Baldwin and Baird 
(2001, 172) point to the fact that even infants as young as 10-11 months are able to detect 
hierarchical structure and in fact they parse continuous action along intention boundaries. 
Moreover, Pastra and Aloimonos (2012, 103) recall that two-year old children can not only parse 
hierarchically organized actions (Bauer 1995), but they also can copy and reproduce them (Whiten 
et al. 2006). In neurophysiology, we should consider studies (such as Fuster 2001; Koechlin, Jubault 
2006; Grafton, Hamilton 2007; Botvinick 2008) that show a topographic organization of the frontal 
cortex in correspondence with different hierarchical levels of action representation. An example is 
Botvinick (2008), where a model is proposed according to which action is represented at 
progressively more abstract levels as we proceed from premotor cortex towards more anterior areas 
of the brain.
As to the second line of argument, in neurophysiological research there is a growing body of 
research suggesting that Broca's area is not a specifically linguistic area, it is instead a crucial 
component of the circuit which processes hierarchical representations in general, in language as 
well as in music and tool use (Tettamanti, Weniger 2006; Koechlin, Jubault 2006; Higuchi et al. 
2007; Clerget et al. 2009; Fadiga et al. 2009; Fazio et al. 2009; Roby-Brami et al. 2012).
From what we have said so far, it seems to follow that there is a strict relationship between 
language and action. Specifically, we have argued that representations in the two domains seem to 
have a quite similar hierarchical structure, and a common neural basis. A reasonable hypothesis is 
that the same domain-general generative process is at play in both domains. If Jackendoff is right, 
this might be a very simple process of unification, insofar as the main weight is put instead on 
representations: it is their hierarchical structure which is supposed to drive the generative 
combination of items. On the basis of our considerations in section 2, this process might be 
intentional in the sense previously specified: a largely automatic process, some portions of which 
partially receives stability thanks to the interaction with conscious attention.
4. Inferential processes
 Let me now address the issue of pragmatic processes. For these, too, a modularist view has 
been argued for, especially by Relevance Theory (Sperber, Wilson 1986/1995; Wilson, Sperber 
2004). A possible alternative is to extend to pragmatics the approach proposed by Jackendoff 
(2007a), that is, the hypothesis of a domain-general unification process operating at different levels 
of linguistic representation. Jackendoff takes into consideration a phonological, a syntactic, and a 
semantic-conceptual level. Pragmatics might be a further level of this general constraint-based 
process, where representations at different levels act as constraints on the result. I do not presume to 
settle here the issue of modularism in pragmatics. My more modest aim is to focus on one 
hypothesis made by Relevance Theory on pragmatic processing and show, once again, its strict 
analogy with non-linguistics processes, specifically, with the ones guiding action.
After Grice, the understanding of utterances in their actual situation of use has been seen as 
an inferential process: utterances do not merely encode the speaker's communicative intentions, 
they are instead evidence on whose basis, together with other contextual assumptions, the addressee 
may inferentially recover those intentions. As relevance theorists would put it, the addressee makes 
an inference having as its premises the explicit content of the utterance and some contextual 
assumptions, and as its conclusion the implicit content (possibly, together with other contextual 
conclusions).
An interesting claim of Relevance Theory is that this inferential activity is not to be 
conceived as a derivation proceeding linearly from premises to conclusions. On the contrary, the 
assumption is that there is a parallel mutual adjustment between premises and conclusions, based on 
both forward and backward inferences. In practice, not only are conclusions inferred forwards 
starting from premises, but premises may also be adjusted backwards as a result of contextual 
expectations about the conclusions to be inferred.
This idea that intentions can be at the same time the result of forward inferences and the 
starting point of backward inferences is also found in the literature on intentional action in general. 
For instance, the Event Coding Theory of Bernhard Hommel (2003; Hommel et al. 2001) claims 
that action goals are represented as perceptual effects associated to the motor act representations 
which have proved apt to pursue those effects in the past. Thanks to the association between motor 
acts and perceptual effects, it is possible both for the observer to make a forward inference from the 
observed movement to the intended effect, and for the agent to make a backward inference from the 
intended effect to the required movement. To be more precise, such a distinction between forward 
inferences in action observation and backward inferences in action execution is a rough 
simplification. It is easy to see that both inferential directions can be found both in execution and 
observation.
I will limit the discussion to the observer's side. It is well known that Rizzolatti's group, and 
especially Vittorio Gallese, has explained intention reading in terms of a form of anticipation. At 
least in the simplest cases, the goal of an action would be the motor act in which the action 
culminates. In practice, on the basis of statistical chaining of motor acts we can make a forward 
inference to the likely intended goal of a given motor act, and thus to the underlying intention:
Determining why a given act (e.g. grasping a cup) was executed can be equivalent 
to detecting the goal of the still not executed and impending subsequent act (e.g. 
bringing the cup to the mouth). (Gallese 2007, 662)
However, other studies conducted by this group seem to show that forward inferences are 
not the only means for perceptual recognition of intentions. In a well-known experimental study, for 
instance, Iacoboni et al. (2005) tested observers with actions (such as grasping a cup) both out of 
context and in contexts suggesting different intentions (drinking tea, cleaning up). In the latter 
condition (presence of context) there was increased activation of premotor mirror neuron area, a 
result strongly suggesting – in the author's words – that “this mirror neuron area actively 
participates in understanding the intentions behind the observed actions” (Iacoboni et al. 2005, 532). 
Since in those experiments the manipulated factor was the presence/absence of a context, it follows 
that, in order to recognize the underlying intention of an observed motor act, mirror areas may be 
sensitive not only to previous motor acts but also to statistically relevant contexts (Mazzone 2011a, 
771-72; for a further discussion of the associative components of mind-reading, see also Mazzone 
2014b). In other words, context is a relevant factor in intention understanding: it suggests the 
underlying intention (in the example, respectively the intention either to drink tea or to clean up) 
independently from the observed action. We should note the similarity between this conclusion and 
the view of Relevance Theory according to which communicative intentions can be suggested 
directly from the context, independently from the possibility to infer this intention forwards starting 
from explicit content.
In sum, goals can not only be inferred from actions used to pursue them (i.e., from means), 
but also from contexts. But then, it is at least a reasonable speculation that goal recognition can 
retroact on the understanding of the involved means. As we said, according to relevance theorists 
contextual expectations on communicative intentions may cause backward adjustments in the 
comprehension of the explicit content of utterances. It is not difficult to imagine analogue situations 
in non-verbal action. For instance, in Iacoboni et al.'s setting the context “after tea” could suggest 
the goal “clean up” and a backward inference from this goal could modify the interpretation of the 
action acting as a means, in case this had been erroneously interpreted as a “drinking” grip.
To sum up, a similar dynamic, based on a double inferential movement going both forwards 
and backwards, might be involved in the comprehension of both utterances and non-verbal actions. 
Obviously, this is far from showing that pragmatic processes have a non-modular nature. Elsewhere 
I have analysed in more detail the nature of pragmatic inferences, arguing that they have in fact a 
non-modular nature (Mazzone 2011b; 2014a; in preparation). My more modest purpose in this 
paper was to focus on the bidirectional dynamic of the inferences that seem to be involved both in 
action and language processing.
4. Conclusions
In this paper, I explored the hypothesis of a unique domain-general process underlying both 
language and action, a process which can be described as i) intentional, in the sense of being 
implemented by an automatic flow of processing which is partially and dynamically granted 
stability thanks to the interaction with conscious attention; ii) generative, due to the hierarchical 
structure of the involved representations; iii) characterized by bidirectional inferences, in that the 
connection between represented means and goals can be used both to predict goals from means and 
to retrodict means from goals.
To be sure, each of these aspects would have required wider justifications than I have 
provided in this paper and some of them can be found in my previous papers I have made reference 
to. However, the main purpose of the present paper was not to argue in detail for any specific thesis. 
It was instead to show the coherence between seemingly disparate lines of research, that is, the 
interesting convergence of different arguments and sources of evidence towards the idea that 
language is just a specific kind of action.
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